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Abstract
The purpose of this qualitative study was to investigate the relationship between the elements/processes of safety management systems
(SMSs) and their impact on safety culture at collegiate flight training institutions. Research questions addressed the following: different
approaches to developing and implementing an SMS, different approaches to the assessment of safety culture, and the relationship
between elements/processes of an SMS and a strong safety culture. A semistructured interview protocol was used. The researcher inter-
viewed five safety professionals at U.S. collegiate flight training institutions of various sizes. Overall, the general consensus among the
participants was that an SMS works best if it is implemented over time. A confidential hazard reporting system and the use of the five-step
Safety Risk Management (SRM) process were viewed as important aspects to help build a strong safety culture. Other elements and
processes were identified as having a strong relationship to safety culture as well. The participants revealed when their institution
experienced a cultural change during SMS development. The study also provides recommendations for establishing a SMS.
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Introduction
The development and adoption of safety management systems (SMSs) continues to gain momentum throughout the
aviation industry. SMS is defined as ‘‘an organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational
structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures’’ (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2013, pp. 1–2).Currently,
SMSs are required for commercial air carriers, and it is anticipated that SMSs will be required for some airports. While
SMSs are not required for flight schools, many safety professionals in the collegiate flight training environment have been
developing and implementing SMSs for the past several years.
Safety professionals are the members of the organization typically responsible for the development and implementation
of an SMS. The implementation of an SMS is usually time-consuming and involves the creation of milestones utilizing the
elements and processes of SMSs as guiding principles. In 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) developed
an SMS implementation guide to assist organizations in systematically developing SMSs. The purpose of the guide was to
help organizations, particularly those involved in the FAA SMS pilot program, develop SMSs to FAA expectations and
international standards (FAA, 2010).
Aviation organizations realize that threats to safety always exist (Adjekum, 2013). An SMS is designed to identify
these threats and mitigate risk before accidents occur. Gill (2004) noted that ‘‘the effectiveness of a SMS depends on how
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well it permeates in the fabric of the organization ‘the
ways in which things are done’ so that a positive safety
culture is generated and maintained in an ongoing manner’’
(p. 233).
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
(2013) states that having a reporting culture is key to
developing a strong safety culture. A reporting culture
involves cultivating an atmosphere where people within the
organization feel comfortable reporting hazards without
fear of reprisal. Dillman, Voges, and Robertson (2009)
conducted a study to try to determine the perceptions of
students regarding failures to report hazards. Dillman et al.
(2009) suggested ‘‘a key ingredient to the success of any
safety culture is the need for information about unsafe
events, activities, or potentially hazardous operations’’ (p. 1).
The reporting of hazards can help an organization with
continuous improvement. The ICAO, (2013) states that
‘‘continuous improvement in safety performance is pos-
sible when safety becomes a value within an organiza-
tion as well as a priority’’ (pp. 2–10). A goal of this study
will be to attempt to identify what the other factors are
within SMSs that enhance culture and increase the value
of safety.
Measuring safety culture is a key aspect of SMS as well
as continuous improvement. Safety culture is the synopsis
of various safety behaviors and attitudes, and the term ‘‘safety
culture’’ means different things to different individuals and
can be challenging to accurately assess. There have been
many studies that have assessed safety culture in all types
of organizations (Gill, 2004; Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson, &
Baker, 2013; Lee & Weitzel, 2005). However, few studies
exist addressing the relationship between SMS implemen-
tation and its impact on developing a strong safety culture
(McNeely, 2012). This qualitative study will focus on the
safety professional’s perceptions of the relationship between
SMSs and safety culture in a collegiate flight training
environment.
Background
A key aspect to the success of an SMS is the presence
of a positive safety culture (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford,
2011). The term ‘‘safety culture’’ has numerous defini-
tions. In a recent study conducted by Adjekum et al.
(2015), a two-pronged definition was used. This approach
utilized a definition by Cooper (2000) as ‘‘a set of shared
values, actions and behaviors that demonstrates a com-
mitment to safety over competing goals and demands’’
(p.113). Another definition of safety culture by Piers,
Montijn, and Balk (2009) indicated ‘‘the set of endur-
ing values and attitudes regarding safety issues, which
were shared by every member of every level of an
organization’’ (p. 5).
The theoretical framework has been established that
there is a relationship between SMSs and safety culture.
McNeely (2012) documented that two theories exist. The
first theory is that SMS implementation leads to a strong
safety culture. To validate this theory, Freiwald et al.
(2013) conducted a study at a multinational multicampus
flight training organization for the purpose of assessing the
attitudes and perceptions of the operations and management
staff. The results of the study concluded that the organi-
zation had a lack of safety culture and recommended the
implementation of an SMS as a result. The second theory
postulated that a strong safety culture caused SMS imple-
mentation (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). McNeely’s
(2012) study identifies that the basis for both of these
theories has not been established empirically and continues
to suggest that more research is recommended in the above-
mentioned theories. McNeely (2012) stated that ‘‘organiza-
tions would benefit from understanding that the level of
organizational safety culture and the level of SMS imple-
mentation relate, although the direction of the causality for
this relationship is not definitive’’ (p. 115). Another recom-
mendation for further research is suggested to measure
the manner in which management’s commitment to safety
affects organizational safety culture development and SMS
implementation.
Another study conducted in 2013 by Adjekum assessed
safety culture at a collegiate four-year flight program. The
purpose of the research was to assess perceptions of various
groups within the organization and to establish a safety
culture assessment methodology that could be replicated
at other universities. The author recommended that more
studies assessing safety culture be conducted at other
flight programs. The results of these studies could be cross-
validated to build a usable database and could help pro-
vide a baseline for the development, implementation, and
continuous improvement of SMSs in collegiate aviation
programs (Adjekum, 2013).
In 2015, Adjekum et al. conducted a cross-sectional
quasi–mixed-methods assessment of safety culture percep-
tions and safety behavior in U.S. collegiate aviation pro-
grams. More specifically, the study’s objective was to
determine what safety culture variables predicted safety
reporting behavior. The authors found that reporting
systems and safety fundamental perceptions were predic-
tors of safety reporting behavior. The results of the
qualitative aspect of the study concluded that many pilots
felt pressure to fly when conditions were considered
unsafe. The participants of the study also thought that
pressure was placed on them when they were not fit
psychologically or physiologically to fly. Ultimately, the
authors recommended that safety awareness and safety
reporting programs extend to all involved in collegiate
aviation programs. The study also concluded that safety
culture assessments continue to be conducted. The authors
noted that qualitative approaches can be effectively utilized
to develop a better understanding of safety culture percep-
tions within collegiate aviation programs.
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Research Questions
This qualitative study investigates the relationship
between the elements and the processes of SMSs and their
impact on safety culture. The primary objective of this
research is to report the perceptions of safety professionals
with regard to this relationship. The following research
questions were addressed:
1. What were the experiences of safety professionals
and the strategies that the flight training institutions
took to develop and implement an SMS?
2. How do different flight training institutions approach
the assessment of safety culture?
3. What elements and processes of an SMS contribute
to a strong safety culture?
Methods
Procedures
The research paradigm chosen for this particular study
was qualitative. Because it is qualitative, this study is not
meant to be generalizable to a greater population. The pur-
pose of the study was to investigate the experiences of
safety professionals who have engaged in SMS develop-
ment and implementation and their perceptions of how
SMSs and safety culture are related. The insights gained
from the safety professionals who were interviewed may
be valuable information to other colleagues engaged in
SMSs. The research tradition chosen for this particular
study would be considered a phenomenology. According to
Creswell (1998), a phenomenology’s focus is to understand
the essence of experiences about a phenomenon. Lichtman
(2013) states that ‘‘Phenomenology, as an approach, looks
at the lived experiences of those who have lived with or
experienced a particular phenomenon’’ (p. 85). An organi-
zation’s safety professionals are typically the individuals
responsible for the development and implementation of
SMSs. They are also the individuals typically responsible
for overseeing the many elements and processes involved
in running an SMS program, including the measurement of
a safety culture. Their perceptions of the relationship
between SMSs and safety culture could assist others with
future SMS development and implementation.
Participants
The sampling technique used for this study was
purposeful sampling. Patton (1990) states that the nature
of qualitative inquiry focuses in depth on somewhat small
sample sizes that are selected purposefully by the researc-
her. The researcher originally selected eight flight schools
utilizing the safety officer contact list maintained by the
University Aviation Association (UAA) safety committee.
The reason for the selection of eight schools was that they
were known by the researcher to have been in the process
of SMS development to varying degrees. Five of the eight
schools responded and agreed to participate in the study
and have varying size of flight training programs. The five
safety professionals interviewed have a significant amount
of experience with safety management in various aspects of
the aviation industry. The researcher e-mailed the safety
professionals selected from the list and asked if they would
participate in the study with a 15–45 minute interview.
The participants were also sent a form asking for their con-
sent to record their interview.
Data Collection
The primary method of data collection was semistruc-
tured interviews with collegiate aviation safety profes-
sionals. Interviews are the primary method for collecting
data when doing a phenomenological study (Creswell,
1998). From the semistructured interview, the author
gained the information to describe the perceptions regard-
ing SMS development and implementation as well as the
relationship between SMS elements and safety culture.
To facilitate the interview, the author utilized a self-developed
interview protocol. Before the semistructured interviews
began, a colleague considered to be a subject matter expert
in SMSs reviewed the interview protocol to ensure its appro-
priateness. The interview questions were designed to engage
the participants in conversation that would lead to discus-
sions regarding the subject matter within the research
questions. After interviews were completed, the author
transcribed each conversation for coding to assist in
identifying common themes. The interview transcrip-
tions and recordings were cross-checked by a colleague
of the researcher to ensure trustworthiness.
Coding is essential to qualitative research. Some researc-
hers often consider coding to be synonymous with analysis
(Hedlund-de Witt, 2013). The coding method employed
was a combination between in vivo coding and descriptive
coding. Hedlund-de Witt (2013) describes descriptive
coding as a ‘‘straightforward coding method used to assign
basic, descriptive labels to data to provide an inventory
of their topics’’ (p. 10). This is often the first step in the coding
process. Since the goal of the study is focusing on the
perceptions of the safety professionals, the author thought it
important to express those perceptions with direct quotes from
the participants. In vivo coding is a method whereby a code is
taken verbatim from the interview and placed in the analysis
inside quotation marks (Hedlund-de Witt, 2013). Therefore, in
vivo coding seems appropriate for this study.
Researcher Positionality
Positionality in any qualitative research study is worthy
of noting and understanding how it may affect the research.
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The author’s position considered for this particular study is
to be a significant factor and one that should be recognized.
The author has served as the safety officer for the Aviation
Department at Southern Illinois University (SIU) since
2007. In this role, the author developed and implemented
an SMS program for the Aviation Management and Flight
Department at SIU over the last four years. The author
believes that an SMS program strengthens a safety culture,
and he has ideas and perceptions as to what processes and
elements enhance and strengthen a safety culture in an organi-
zation. He also recognizes that his experience is based on one
organization. This experience has led him to be interested in
the perceptions of others and gain a better understanding of
the relationship between SMSs and safety culture.
Limitations
There were a couple of limitations concerning the type of
sampling utilized and the sample size. Using a purposeful
sample from the UAA network and a small sample size of
safety professionals limits the study to just their experi-
ences. While useful, others outside of this group may have
other experiences concerning SMSs and safety culture that
could benefit colleagues in the flight training environment.
Results and Discussion
During the interviews, basic descriptive data was
gathered from the participants. To determine the approx-
imate size of the institution represented by each safety
professional interviewed, see the data in Table 1.
SMS Development and Implementation
One of the goals of the research was to gain insight into
the experiences of safety professionals and how flight
training organizations have developed and implemented
SMSs or are in the process of SMS development. The first
research question asked ‘‘What were the experiences of
safety professionals and the approach that the flight train-
ing organizations took to develop and implement a Safe-
ty Management System?’’ The majority of organizations
gauged their SMS progress in a series of steps. A safety
professional (SP) from Institution 1 stated, ‘‘We were told
to expect about one year per level; if you could do it faster,
then you may be taking shortcuts. People only move so
fast; cultures only change so fast.’’ The SP in this case was
referring to the levels established by the FAA. Only Insti-
tution 3 chose to take two years to write its SMS and then
implement the SMS all at once. The SP for this organi-
zation mentioned that this choice has worked well for them.
Many organizations do not have the resources to imple-
ment an SMS all at once. Institution 2 is an example, for it
is a smaller organization and has established an SMS over
time, and the SP believes that they are about 50–60%
complete. The SP from Institution 4 reported that ‘‘jumping
in and trying it all at once would be too big for us to
swallow. It’s up to me to do it, so we are just going to
have to do it in steps.’’ Institution 5 also has many of the
elements of an SMS, including hazard reporting, a safety
committee, and supplies feedback to an individual submit-
ting a report. They have experienced a change of leader-
ship, and the continuous development of an SMS has
become a challenge.
Overall, the general consensus among the participants
was that an SMS works best if it is implemented over time.
The SP from Institution 5 commented, ‘‘It [the SMS] takes
a long-term commitment that never stops.’’ Even Institution
3, an institution that implemented its SMS all at once, still
planned its SMS for a couple of years prior to imple-
mentation.
Safety Culture and Assessment
The second research question asked ‘‘How do different
flight training institutions approach the assessment of safety
culture?’’ Each safety professional was also asked about his
or her assessment of safety culture, including how they
assessed culture in the past as well as currently and what
kind of changes they have seen in safety culture as they
have developed and implemented SMSs. All of the institu-
tions have methods to assess safety culture within their
organization except for Institution 2. The SP from Institu-
tion 2 understands the need to develop a method to assess
safety culture within the organization and will probably
implement something in the coming year. Institution 4 has
conducted safety culture assessments in the past, but they
were not a formalized process.
Frequencies regarding the assessment of culture varied
among the group. Table 2 identifies the variation among
the flight training institutions.
In general, all SPs from each organization, includ-
ing Institution 2, believed that they had a strong safety
culture, although they all mentioned that there were areas
for improvement. For example, the SP from Institution 5
stated that ‘‘Our overall safety culture is fairly positive,
Table 1
Size of Flight Training Institutions.
Institution 1 Institution 2 Institution 3 Institution 4 Institution 5
Aircraft 120 18 65 8 15
Students 1,500 40 1,300 100 90
CFIs 175 4 150 10 15
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so is the operation safe? Those kind of questions came
back positive. But, as for the feedback loop, that seemed
opaque. They would fill out on the survey that they
[individuals in the organization] don’t see the benefits of
the SMS.’’
Institution 1 did not assess safety culture prior to SMS
implementation. The SP stated that ‘‘Someone would
come up with questions here and there but would never
go back to reanalyze it; trends were never looked at.’’ He
went on to say that ‘‘Yes, we started assessing safety cul-
ture four years ago. Formally we sat down as a committee
and decided how many questions would be asked and what
they would be [for the safety culture survey]. The process
took six months of committee work prior to that.’’ The SP
noticed a culture change when the accountable executive
and process owners started to ‘‘drink the SMS Kool-Aid.’’
Safety became everyone’s program because of the safety
culture questions and the visibility that the survey was
receiving.
Institution 3 started working on safety culture assessment
four years prior to SMS implementation. The SP recog-
nized that a reporting culture is a major part of safety
culture and stated that ‘‘we always knew the importance of
a reporting culture but never had a formal ASAP [Aviation
Safety Action Program] until two years ago. . . . [R]eporting
has been vibrant since 2002.’’ In terms of any change in
safety culture as a result of SMS, the SP stated:
If we didn’t have the foundation of the current design of
SMS, our culture might have tapered off because we
have been through some leadership changes. Because of
the way SMS is written, it formalized the concept of
accountable executive, so some of the leadership
changes were dramatic at the flight department level
but not at [the] presidential level. If culture started to
taper, [the] SMS mandated some requirements so the
culture could not go too far out of whack. . . . Had strong
culture before SMS but now, … now with SMS and
formalized components and the advent of ASAP we
have seen strength in our reporting culture because now
they know they are protected. SMS has made a strong
indent in enhancing and sustaining the safety culture that
we want.
Without having a formal safety culture assessment,
Institution 2 had an overall positive impression of its safety
culture. The SP stated that ‘‘We went from the total idea
of ‘I’m not going to report anything’ to at least some
voluntary ideas and suggestions along with some incident
reporting.’’ The SP also mentioned that the nonpunitive
aspect of hazard reporting has had a positive influence on
Institution 2’s safety culture.
Institution 4 had been doing some informal assessments
prior to SMS but was not necessarily tracking trends. The
SP thought that, overall, the safety culture was strong: ‘‘The
students seem to be responding positively to it, I get a lot of
feedback and questions from the students . . . as well as
from the instructors [regarding SMS].’’ He also mentioned
that there was a significant increase in reporting.
Other methods for assessing culture that were used
consisted of observations, including Line Oriented Safety
Assessments (LOSAs) and reporting frequency. Institution 3
and Institution 1 both firmly believe that reporting fre-
quency is a key component of assessing safety culture.
Institution 3 measures its reporting frequency with flight
hours.
SMS Elements and Processes
The third research question asked ‘‘What elements and
processes of a Safety Management System contribute to a
strong safety culture?’’ The four components—safety policy,
safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety
promotion—have many elements and processes within them
that make the system work. All participants mentioned that it
takes all of the components to build a culture. The SP from
Institution 1 stated that ‘‘You really know you have the
culture if, you can see a need, see a hazard, see a risk. [Y]ou
do some risk mitigation and go to component one to
establish new policy, and you get rid of old policy, promote
and train it in component four . . . [and] then go back and
reassess through assurance to see that it is doing what you
think it is doing.’’ However, more specifically, having a
confidential hazard reporting system is key to developing a
strong culture, which was a common theme from all of the
SPs. One SP stated that ‘‘Reporting is the most important.
It does not matter the size that you are.’’
Component two, safety risk management, was high-
lighted through a few of the conversations as being
extremely important to building a strong safety culture,
specifically the utilization of the safety risk management
five-step process. Training and education was also men-
tioned, with the SP from Institution 4 saying ‘‘convincing
everyone that a SMS is beneficial to them through training
and education.’’ Another SP agreed: ‘‘Education and
training is essential.’’ The SP from Institution 5 summed
up the most important elements and processes, which
Table 2
Frequency of Safety Culture Assessment.
Institution 1 Institution 2 Institution 3 Institution 4 Institution 5
Biannually N/A Annually Not formalized Annually
Plans on quarterly
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included organizational commitment, nonpunitive report-
ing, communication, and safety assurance processes.
At the end of the conversation, all participants were
asked their thoughts regarding the two theories documented
by McNeely (2012). All of the SPs identified with the
theory that a strong safety culture builds an SMS, rather
than the opposite. One very experienced SP even stated that
‘‘I’ve never seen any systemic changes to culture by the
presentation of a manual.’’
Conclusions
This study sought to investigate the perception of safety
professionals within flight training organizations with
regard to SMS and safety culture. Of the five participating
institutions, only two had a fully deployed SMS. The other
three had been working on it for a few years and had many
of the elements and processes in place. No matter the level,
all but one found it useful to implement in steps generally
coinciding with the FAA’s methodology of levels. All of
the SPs reported their belief that they had a strong safety
culture. However, one institution reported not having a
formally assessed safety culture. There are many ways to
assess safety culture. The most common form is through a
survey instrument. A survey instrument can be useful and
give both quantitative and qualitative data. Only two of the
institutions utilized other methods, such as LOSAs, flight
data management, audits, and observations.
The SPs all had different perceptions regarding the most
important elements and processes within the SMS structure
that helped build a strong safety culture. A confidential
hazard reporting system was viewed as the most important
aspect to help build a strong safety culture. Other elements
that had a strong relationship to safety culture that received
attention from multiple SPs were education, training, and
the SRM five-step process. During the development and
implementation of SMSs, the multiple SPs identified a
couple of instances when they experienced culture change.
The first occurrence was when they had a commitment
from the accountable executive, and the second was when
the stakeholders in the organization realized the benefits of
SMSs through changes being made from hazard reporting
and safety culture assessments.
Recommendations
Building a safety culture and an SMS takes time and is a
never-ending process. It is interesting that all the SPs
identified a time when they witnessed a safety culture
change during the SMS development but also had an
overwhelming feeling that it is a strong safety culture that
builds an SMS. The reality based on the safety profes-
sional’s perceptions is that it is a circular relationship. The
author recommends that future studies, both qualitative and
quantitative, continue to focus on this relationship between
SMSs and safety culture. Future studies could also focus on
safety behavior indicators and targets and how those might
be used to establish a quantitative study to parallel a quali-
tative study similar to this one.
Hazard reporting was discussed in great length with
every SP. One SP commented that he would like to see
more research when comparing the relationship between
quantity of hazard reports and safety culture. The author
agrees that more research could be done in this area,
including future qualitative studies that could also inves-
tigate reasons for nonreporting as well as the relationship
between the reporting process and safety culture.
The participants of the study agree that when an organi-
zation engages in the development and implementation of
an SMS, it can seem like an overwhelming process. The
participants were asked to provide recommendations to
those who have not started or are just in the beginning
stages of developing an SMS. Some common themes from
the participants are listed below:
N Take your time. Utilize the FAA’s methodology for
developing SMS.
N Realize that it is an ongoing and a long-term
commitment.
N Involve all the stakeholders, from the students and
staff all the way to the accountable executive.
N Establish a reporting system (web-based if possible).
N Reporting process needs to include feedback to the
reporter.
N Assess safety culture from the beginning of the
development process and on a continual basis that
works for your organization.
N Develop a safety committee and meet and discuss
progress on a regular basis.
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